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The National Identity IV: India's original "Cold Start" and the day the Indian military nearly went rogue

Arun Singh strode away into the mountains of Almora, the heartland of Kumaon. If it felt like a betrayal of his close friend Rajiv Gandhi, it was at least a decision taken with a heavy heart. Thrice, he had been persuaded by Prime Minister Gandhi to continue as Minister of State for defense, but with the weight of the Bofors scandal sagging shoulders in the Ministry of Defense, he thought it was best to go. He had wrenched himself away to an altogether different world, far removed from Delhi not just in distance but even more so in time, and he had no intention of returning.

The year was 1988. A year earlier he helped oversee an operation which brought a freshly nuclear armed Pakistan and India to the brink of war.

The intervening years between 1974, when India displayed her nuclear might, and 1987 were largely peaceful, in the conventional sense. India and Pakistan didn't engage in open conflict, but as the arms race between the two neighbours heated up, so did the misadventures. In Operation Meghdoot in 1984, India wrestled control of the highest battlefield in the world, Siachen Glacier. With the Simla Agreement in 1972, failing to demarcate Indian and Pakistani territory, India for once, assumed a defensively-offensive posture to capture the area beyond point NJ9842, referred to as "thence north to the glaciers" in the Simla Agreement. As India had preempted Pakistan, India had the advantage of commanding the heights and used it to devastating effect to counter wave after wave of Pakistani attempts to gain a foothold on the glacier. More than thirty years on, India still controls the entire Siachen Glacier.

Perhaps buoyed by this daring manoeuvre, the Indian Army wasted little time in developing blueprints for future "preemptive" and "defensively-offensive" strikes. The Indian Government had, since Independence, assumed a purely defensive posture but under Chief of Army Staff General Sundarji, the military was at least ready to showcase its conventional might, as a sign of deterrence to Pakistan.

Impact of EU Political Conditionality Toward Democratic Consolidation in Turkey Post-Helsinki Summit [2]

On Sui Generis

I want to continue our discussion about the 'Impact of EU Political Conditionality Toward Democratic Consolidation in Turkey Post-Helsinki Summit'. But first of all, I want to emphasize that this research was based on several literature. The first most influential work that inspired my research was (obviously) Ali Resul Usul's book entitled 'Democracy in Turkey : The Impact of EU Political Conditionality (2011)'. It is one of the most interesting yet helpful book I have ever read about Democratic Consolidation in Turkey. Statistically, the book itself contribute up to 48,38% data in my research. I really suggest you to read his opus. The second book was Geoffrey Pridham's book. 'Designing Democracy : EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-Communist Europe (2005)' was able to present a very clear explanation of how EU's policy were made and shifts through some period of time, particularly toward the post-communist nations. At least, these two books have helped me to finish my research.

(Euronews the Network : Turkey's EU Membership Ambitions)

Now, back to our main topic, first of all we have to further explore what is European Union Political Conditionality. This is Variable One (V1)

The emphasis on the relation between membership and the necessity for each member state to be governed democratically originated with The Birkelbach Report, published in 1962 by the political committee of the European Parliament. It specified the conditions for eventual membership:

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